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I. Introduction
There are several gate-keeping devices by which a court may defer
its examination of challenges to the action or inaction of administrative
agencies. Central among such devices are the doctrines of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, ripeness, and the requirement of final
agency action.' These doctrines, as is discussed in detail throughout
this Article, substantially overlap in untidy ways, generating great
unpredictability in their application. It can be argued that such un-
predictability is harmless2 in that the same judicial result can be reached
by employing each of the above doctrines according to taste.' More
may be at stake, however, than mere jurisprudential fastidiousness.
This Article will argue that the gate-keeping doctrines, such as ex-
haustion, ripeness, and finality, more strongly implicate constitutional
considerations than is commonly recognized; that they implicate such
constitutional concerns in more than just the Article III sense of the
presence or absence of a requisite case or controversy; and that there
is no guarantee that the gate-keeping doctrines are utterly fungible in
these respects. While this Article will offer some suggestions aimed at
clarifying the outlines of the gate-keeping doctrines, its major purpose
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1. Other inescapably related doctrines, such as that of primary jurisdiction, receive
some scattered attention.
2. See 4 K. DAvIs, ADMiNISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE § 26.10, at 458 (2d ed. 1983).
3. Consider, for example, the common result reached by three utterly disparate
means by the separate opinions of the three judge panel in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
F.T.C., 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987), discussed in more detail in the concluding
section below.
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is to warn that the use of these doctrines may involve unrecognized
constitutional stakes, particularly with respect to Article II executive
branch functioning and the separation of powers, in general.
II. An Overview of the Overlap
Any overlap of the doctrines of exhaustion, ripeness, and finality
stems primarily from their common focus on the timing of judicial
action. It has been said that each of these doctrines has the effect of
requiring the parties involved "to wait until an agency has completed
all of the steps in the administrative process necessary to formulate,
and sometimes to implement, a policy before any aspect of the agency's
action can be subjected to judicial review." '4 The connection between
each of these doctrines and the problem of the timing of judicial
action is so close that some courts have been led to cultivate explicit
ambiguity as to the meaning of "ripeness." One court has chosen to
say that "[rlipeness, when applied to administrative cases, is actually
a generic concept dealing with the related doctrines of exhaustion of
remedies, finality, and ripeness." 5 Regardless.-of whether this equivo-
cation is worth the confusion it permits, it does at least illustrate that
there is a broad sense of "ripeness" which is virtually synonymous
with proper timing.
Pairwise comparisons of the gate-keeping doctrines do little to clarify
their respective boundaries. To say, for example, that "[rlipeness law
tends to overlap with ... exhaustion ' 6 is to understate the matter.
While unripeness and prematurity are virtually synonymous, prematurity
and a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies have also
been clearly and closely related.' Furthermore, exhaustion has been
discussed as a condition, and perhaps under the circumstances a
sufficient condition, for the ripeness for judicial review of an admin-
4. R. PIERCE, S. SiAImo & P. VERcUnL, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §
5.7, at 180 (1985).
5. Dawson v. Cole, 485 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); see also L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATrVE ACTION 395 (1965) (ripeness as "not so
much a definable doctrine as . . . a group of related doctrines arising in diverse but
analogically similar situations").
6. 4 K. DAVIs, supra note 2, at 350.
7. See, e.g., County of Contra Costa v. State, 177 Cal. App. 3d 62, 73, 222
Cal. Rptr. 750, 761 (1986) ("A judicial action before the legislative process has been
completed is premature and a court is without jurisdiction until administrative remedies
have been exhausted.").
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istrative decision.8 Some attempt to differentiate ripeness and exhaustion
has been made on the grounds that "the exhaustion doctrine focuses
on procedure while the ripeness doctrine focuses on substance." 9 As
will be shown below, however, ripeness often imports procedural
concerns at least indirectly,' 0 and the exhaustion doctrine often involves
substantive considerations."
Thus, the boundary between ripeness and exhaustion remains elu-
sive. 1 2 Unfortunately, the boundary between exhaustion and finality is
no more easily established. The requirement of exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies has been said to be analogous to the requirement of
finality for appellate review of lower court decisions.13 Cases expressly
decided on grounds of lack of a final agency order, but which were
implicitly decided on grounds of lack of exhaustion, illustrate the
substantial overlap of exhaustion and finality. The recent case of Sierra
Club v. N.R.C.,14 for example, expressly analyzed one of the issues
8. See Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1341 (9th Cir.
1987). It is not clear from Schowengerdt whether exhaustion was thought in this case
to be a key to ripeness in a narrow, doctrinal sense, or ripeness in the "generic"
sense of non-prematurity. One is inclined to assume the latter.
9. State v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864, 870 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing 5 B. MEZINES, J.
STEIN & J. GRAFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 48.01, at 48-3-4 (1985)). The reference
to ripeness here is presumably to the non-generic sense.
10. For example, an issue may tend to be more suitable for judicial resolution if
the issue has been raised, developed, and crystallized in a prior administrative
proceeding. See generally Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 875 S. Ct.
1520, 18 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1967).
11. For example, the exhaustion requirement is often waived on the basis of
substantive considerations, such as the practical futility of such a resort to the agency
procedures, or the threat of irreparable harm if the petitioner is required to exhaust
administrative remedies. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.
Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969).
12. At one point, Professor Davis sought to distinguish the two doctrines by
arguing that exhaustion applied in the context of agency adjudication, but that ripeness
applied in the context of agency regulation and other administrative action not embodied
in a regulation or final order. See Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion
of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction, 28 TEx. L. REv. 168
(1949). This unduly rigorous attempt at compartmentalization has since been abandoned
by Professor Davis. See 4 K. DAvIs, supra note 2, at 350. Professor Davis suggests
that "the ripeness focus is on the types of functions that courts should perform, and
the exhaustion focus is on the narrow question of how far a party must pursue an
administrative remedy before going to court. . . ." Id. One element of the thesis of
this Article is that cases in which the focus is on the exhaustion requirement may
also, with respect to the exhaustion issue, require attention to the types of functions
that courts should perform in a system of separated coordinate governmental powers.
13. See L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 424.
14. 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987).
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presented in terms of lack of a final agency order. 5 The underlying
policy logic relied upon by the court in Sierra Club, however, could
just as easily have suited a decision based on a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The court observed that " '[j]udicial interven-
tion in uncompleted administrative proceedings, absent a statutory
mandate is strongly disfavored.' . . . We will not entertain a petition
where pending administrative proceedings ... might render the case
moot and judicial review completely unnecessary.' 1 6 This logic is, in
part, the same as that of the doctrine of administrative exhaustion. 7
More remarkably, both exhaustion and finality are treated as com-
ponents or aspects of, or as one consideration bearing upon, the other
doctrine. In National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v.
Thomas," the determination that the challenged agency orders were
final was explicitly taken into consideration in the putatively broader
inquiry as to whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should be
required in the particular case.' 9 Professor Davis has also referred to
finality as a factor in making or accounting for a decision on whether
exhaustion should be required.20 On the other hand, at least in social
security cases, a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been treated as merely one component of the putatively broader
question of whether the statutory final decision requirement has been
met. 21
Perhaps the most noteworthy attempt to distinguish the roles of
finality and exhaustion is that of Judge Leventhal in Association of
National Advertisers, Inc. v. F.T.C.22 Judge Leventhal's concurring
opinion referred to finality and exhaustion as "analytically distinct ' 23
and urged that "[o]ne requirement may be applicable even when the
15. Id. at 1361-62.
16. Id. at 1362 (citing Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 626
(9th Cir. 1979)).
17. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194
(1969) (contains an extensive policy discussion).
18. 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
19. Id. at 879-80.
20. See Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines, supra note 12, at 169.
21. See Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (1982)). The most authoritative case cited in this regard is the well-known case
of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976); see
also Luna v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (D. Colo. 1986) (exhaustion as waivable
element of statutory final decision requirement).
22. 627 F.2d 1151, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
23. Id. at 1177 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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other is not." ' 24 In order to elucidate the distinction, though, Judge
Leventhal observes that "the mere conduct of proceedings on a proposal
of a rule, which may never be adopted or enforced, is not final action,
and a court will not enjoin a rulemaking proceeding on a claim that
the agency had no statutory or constitutional authority to promulgate
the proposed rule." ' 25 What Judge Leventhal does not explain, however,
is why this principle requires a finality analysis, over and above an
exhaustion analysis. Under a rigorous exhaustion approach, a court
could require a litigant to exhaust administrative proceedings even if
the major issue was the agency's constitutional authority to conduct
the proceeding in the first place. 26
Finality similarly appears to merge with the ripeness doctrine. The law
of finality and ripeness, which has been accurately characterized by then-
Judge Scalia of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals as"complex, ' 2 7 takes a part of its complexity from the substantial overlap
of the concepts in practice. Occasionally, the terms are treated as virtually
synonymous. 2 One commentator implicitly suggests that ripening is a
process of which finality is an end state or result.29 Commonly, though,
cases refer to finality as one factor, if not the essential factor, in
determining whether the case or issue is ripe for judicial review.3 0 While
it seems apparent that an agency action may be unripe for judicial review
even though final, or sufficiently final, 3 the precise relationship between
ripeness and finality is unsettled.12
24. Id. (Leventhal, I., concurring).
25. Id. at 1178 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
26. See the opinion of Judge Edwards in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 814 F.2d
731 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978).
27. Western Union Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 773 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
28. See Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. N.R.C., 803 F.2d 258, 261
(6th Cir. 1986) (Jones, J., dissenting).
29. See B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.1, at 522 (2d ed. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1444, 1451 (3d
Cir. 1987) (issue is fit for review if the agency resolution is "final" and the issue is"essentially legal"); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. United States E.P.A., 801 F.2d 430, 435
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (above factors plus "whether consideration of that issue would benefit
from a more concrete setting") (referring to finality as a matter of degree); Mid-Tex
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (asserting that
"[tihe fitness requirement is essentially one of finality").
31. See, e.g., Consolidated Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n., 824 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("even when agency action is final and the
issues presented are purely legal, a court may properly deem a matter unfit for
resolution if postponing review would provide for a more efficient examination and
disposition of the issues").
32. Compare the cases cited in note 30 among themselves and with the authorities
cited in notes 28 and 29.
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This conceptual comparison can be extended, with similarly murky
results, even further. The relationship between the doctrines of ex-
haustion and primary jurisdiction is one of indistinct overlap and
questionably-accurate formulae for differentiation. In this context, one
court has gone so far as to suggest that "[flor all practical purposes,
there is no difference between requiring exhaustion of and requiring
deferral to an administrative remedy." 33 Less strongly, it has been said
that the doctrines of administrative exhaustion and primary jurisdiction
serve similar purposes,34 or merely that they are "conceptually anal-
ogous."35
In an effort to differentiate the two concepts, one court asserted
that " '[t]he exhaustion principle divides largely into two doctrines,
(1) exhaustion of administrative remedies and (2) primary jurisdic-
tion.' ",36 This formulation states a useful and coherent view only if"exhaustion" is thought of in a generic and a more particular sense.
Exhaustion in the generic sense would involve something like allowing
or requiring either the commencement of, or continuation through,
its useful course of an agency proceeding. Exhaustion in the more
particular sense would be limited to something like not judicially
interrupting an actual ongoing agency proceeding.
The case law and related literature substantially support a narrow
conception of exhaustion in the particular sense, as long as the
administrative proceedings are pending. One court has clearly spec-
ified that "exhaustion .. . contemplates a situation where some
administrative action has begun, but has not yet been completed;
where there is no administrative proceeding under way, the exhaustion
doctrine has no application. '3 7 Despite the support for this ap-
proach,38 it is far from clear that it accurately describes the actual
33. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 813 F.2d 1441, 1450 n.12 (9th Cir.
1987) (adding that "[iln either case there can be no litigation before the agency has
acted").
34. See Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376, 392 n.5 (1985).
35. R. PIERCE, S. SHArPmo & P. VERK iL, supra note 4, at 206.
36. Zar v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 376 N.W.2d 54, 55
(S.D. 1985) (quoting Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 93, 228 N.W.2d 640, 642
(1975)).
37. Sharkey v. City of Stamford, 196 Conn. 253, 492 A.2d 171, 173 (1985)
(distinguishing exhaustion from primary jurisdiction); see also Murphy v. Administrator
of Div. of Personnel Admin., 377 Mass. 217, 386 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1979) (also
distinguishing exhaustion from primary jurisdiction). Both Murphy and Sharkey refer
to the underlying rationale for exhaustion and primary jurisdiction as being in substance
much the same, based on orderly judicial review of decisions with the benefit of
agency findings and conclusions.
38. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 121; R. PIERCE, S. SsmkPnto & P. VERKuYM,
supra note 4, at 485.
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language of all of the cases. Whether used loosely or carefully, a
number of cases employ the concept of an exhaustion requirement
in referring to controversies in which no relevant administrative
proceeding is currently under way, or has ever been begun.
To choose among recent, almost random examples, one might briefly
consider Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.39 In this case, the court chose
the rubric of failure to exhaust administrative remedies to refer to
Union Oil's failure "to seek any type of administrative review'' 4° of
the terms of a permit issued by the California Water Review Board
years before, given Union Oil's desire for a modification of the terms
of the permit. 4' To similar effect, in a different context, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used the rubric of failure to
exhaust to refer to the National Resources Defense Council's failure
to participate in the comment process in the underlying agency rule-
making proceedings that issued in the regulations in controversy. 42
The notion of administrative exhaustion as including failure to
commence administrative processes of redress similarly has some rea-
sonably explicit support in the literature, 43 and is fairly implied by the
logic of some of the most commonly made generalizations in the area
of exhaustion. For example, it is said that as a general rule, whatever
the exceptions, "[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies usually is not
a condition precedent to suit under § 1983."" Whatever courts mean
when they say this, it is not merely that a section 1983 plaintiff need
not see through to completion any administrative proceeding he has
in fact commenced or in which he has participated. Ultimately, then,
any restriction of the scope of the exhaustion doctrine to cases of
commenced, but allegedly insufficiently completed, administrative pro-
ceedings seems arbitrary.
One final attempt to differentiate exhaustion from primary jurisdic-
tion should be noted. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he basic
39. 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 1486-87.
41. Id.
42. See National Resources Defense Council v. United States E.P.A., 804 F.2d
710, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per Bork, J.), vacated, 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
43. See B. ScHwARTz, supra note 29, § 8.34, at 512.
44. Lewis v. Meyer, 815 F.2d 43, 44 (7th Cir. 1987) (relying upon Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1982) (citing as an
exception a provision of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act)).
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difference is that primary jurisdiction determines whether a court or
an agency has initial jurisdiction; exhaustion determines whether review
may be had of agency action that is not the last agency word in the
matter. ' 45 Stated more concisely, "[tihe exhaustion doctrine prevents
premature judicial interference with administrative proceedings, while
the primary jurisdiction doctrine denies jurisdiction where agency
proceedings have not yet begun." 46 While this view is coherent, it must
be recognized that such language would be heavily qualified by the
principle that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of an agency does
not operate to divest the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the
case. The courts have recognized that " '[tihe doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, despite what the term may imply, does not speak to the
jurisdictional power of the federal courts.' ,,41 It follows that " '[wihere
the doctrine applies, jurisdiction is not thereby ousted, but only
postponed.' ",48
Thus, the cases and commentators have not clearly established the
line of demarcation between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction any
more than they have for the other pairs of concepts discussed above.
The fact that such a remarkably untidy overlap and chronic lack of
boundary clarity among all of the doctrines could persist is initially
surprising. Courts and commentators take as their charge to reconcile
and to clarify, in one fashion or another. It is a condition of vague
and substantial doctrinal overlap and apparent doctrinal redundancy
that appears unstable. The condition's persistence requires explanation,
even if the disarray is utterly harmless and inconsequential. If the
doctrinal untidiness discussed above were no more than that, and
without practical significance, we would still expect the contours of
the doctrines to be gradually clarified and distinguished, or for some
concepts to fall into disuse as superfluous. Courts have an interest in
doctrinal clarity and costless simplification of doctrine. If the doctrinal
disarray is practically trivial, we would expect, at worst, that this
gradual process of doctrinal clarification would proceed more slowly-
or perhaps even more rapidly, in light of the presumed low stakes.
The explanation offered by this Article for this perpetual confusion
is that the confusion in this area may in fact be useful to lawyers and
45. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, § 8.23, at 485.
46. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
47. United States v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R., 717 F.2d 593, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
48. Id. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83
S. Ct. 1715, 1736, 10 L. Ed. 2d 915, 939 (1963)).
[11:83
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
courts, at least in some cases. This usefulness may be enough to
explain its persistence. Specifically, the Article suggests that confusion
in the form of broad overlap of the doctrines allows for great flexibility
or freedom in the theory of one's case or opinion. Even more
specifically, it is widely thought, whether reasonable or not, that the
doctrines of ripeness, exhaustion, finality, and primary jurisdiction
differ in the degrees to which each implicates constitutional values. If
the various doctrines are thought to differ in the degree to which they
have constitutional status, and if they also substantially overlap, the
possibilities for raising or avoiding constitutional concerns, according
to one's interest or preferences, are enhanced. This process could be
occurring, in a recognized or unrecognized way, regardless of whether
the logic of the doctrines actually justifies finding them of differing
constitutional status.
This is not to deny that there may be considerable confusion over
whether, to what extent, or precisely how, doctrines such as ripeness
implicate one or more constitutional concerns. In fact, a substantial
amount of this type of confusion is present, as we shall see immediately
below. There will still, however, tend to be cases in which a judge or
lawyer likes, or dislikes, what he considers to be the constitutional
component of one of the doctrines, or the absence of such a component,
and chooses to couch his legal argument or opinion in terms of one
of the doctrines rather than another precisely for that reason.
III. The Constitutional Dimensions of the Timing Doctrines
The courts and commentators are divided on the question of whether
each of the doctrines has any significant constitutional component. It
is a thesis of this essay that even when such constitutional components
are recognized by the courts, part of the constitutional dimension is
often missed. Specifically, even when the courts ascribe some consti-
tutional content to the timing doctrines, it is usually in the nature of
a case-or-controversy concern, rather than a separation of powers
concern. In other words, when courts see a constitutional dimension,
they too often focus on Article III concerns, when they should be
equally concerned with agency powers under Article II. In extreme
cases, the focus on Article III concerns may impair, at least indirectly,
the Article I legislative authority of Congress.
Standard accounts of the doctrine of finality provide an example of
this problem. One set of commentators has observed that while there
are a variety of considerations underlying the finality doctrine, finality"may have a constitutional component, since there is no 'case' or
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'controversy' within the court's decision making power under Article
III until the agency has taken actions sufficient to create 'concrete
adverseness' between it and the party seeking judicial review." '49 While
these commentators do well to recognize the possibility of constitutional
implications in a question of finality, it should be clear, at least in
extreme cases, that ignoring the demands of finality may be thought
to offend the separation of powers in general and judicial respect for
executive branch functioning under Article II in particular. This need
not invariably be a matter of a merely discretionary exercise of the
court's authority to delay hearing a case for prudential reasons based
in a judicial conception of sound policy. A finding of lack of finality
may, in an extreme case, be fairly mandated by Article II. As the
commentators quoted above recognize, the Supreme Court has required
courts to respect agency autonomy in such crucial matters as setting
their own agency priorities. 50 Beyond some point, judicial disregard
for such considerations impairs agency functioning in a way violative
of Article II.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is thought to have even less
constitutional dimension than the doctrine of finality. Primary juris-
diction is thought of as a prudential, court-created doctrine that looks
to the practical advantages and disadvantages of an initial recourse
through an agency and its expertise, rather than through a court.5 ' At
some point, however, an Article II concern must arise, because one
of the considerations thought to underlie the doctrine is whether
allocating the matter at issue initially to the courts will adversely affect
the agency's ability to carry out its congressional mandate by performing
its regulatory responsibilities.?2 If this consequence impends from the
court's initial adjudication of the matter, there is also a concern that
the court is impinging upon the proper scope of congressional Article
I authority. Congress may have intended no such arrangement and no
such result on the theory that such would be inconsistent with its
intended regulatory scheme.53 It should be recognized, therefore, that
there is a deeper constitutional mandate for applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in certain cases that extends beyond purely prag-
49. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPmO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 4, § 5.7.1, at 183.
50. Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519,
544-45, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1212, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460, 480 (1978)).
51. Id. at 206; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, § 8.24, at 488.
52. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPmo & P. VERKUIL, supra note 4, § 5.8, at 206-07.
53. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 813 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir.
1987).
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matic concerns over administrative expertise of non-constitutional el-
ements of inter-branch coordination. 4
A similar story could be told with regard to the doctrine of
exhaustion. While opinions differ on the matter, it is often thought
that the application of the exhaustion doctrine is, in the absence of a
statute requiring exhaustion, a matter of the court's discretion to be
reviewed only for abuse of discretion." The underlying logic of the
exhaustion requirement, however, may demand more. Under the ap-
propriate circumstances, the failure to require exhaustion regarding an
exception to the rule may amount to undue judicial interference with
the work of the administrative agency. 6 Such concerns slide incre-
mentally into deeper problems of "maintaining an efficient, independent
administrative system. . . . "7 In perhaps the leading exhaustion case,
McKart v. United States,58 the Supreme Court recognized the proper
degree of executive branch and administrative agency autonomy as
among the values or aims underlying the exhaustion requirement. 9 The
intrusion upon the proper scope of autonomy of another governmental
branch unavoidably risks action violative of the separation of powers.
Whether liked or disliked, the administrative exhaustion requirement
has a constitutional component, whether or not it derived its basis
from a statute 6
This point is lost sight of not only from a failure to recognize the
deeper implications of the logic of exhaustion, but also from an unduly
narrow judicial focus, in some instances, on the perspective of the
individual seeking a waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Admittedly,
it is tempting to assume that because the law does not require the
54. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. MV Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1026 (2d Cir. 1987)
(principal reason for primary jurisdiction is to encourage interbranch coordination)
(citing 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW § 19.01, at 5 (1958)).
55. See, e.g., Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. U.S.D.A., 817 F.2d 609,
619 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Rocky Mt. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 743
n.12 (10th Cir. 1982)); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. C.H.G. Int'l., Inc., 811 F.2d 1209,
1223 (9th Cir. 1987) (specifying no statutory exhaustion requirement). But see County
of Contra Costa v. State, 177 Cal. App. 3d 62, 73, 222 Cal. Rptr. 750, 757 (1986)
(doctrine of administrative exhaustion not a matter of judicial discretion).
56. See B. SCHWARTz, supra note 29, § 8.30, at 503.
57. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. C.H.G. Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir.
1987).
58. 395 U.S. 185, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969).
59. Id. at 193-94; see also L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 425 ("exhaustion . . .is ...
an expression of executive and administrative autonomy").
60. Cf. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 768 (9th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing that exhaustion issues may have a constitutional separation of powers
component, but only in the case of statutorily imposed exhaustion requirements).
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performance of a useless act, exhaustion should be waived or excused
as futile if the plaintiff certainly, or even probably, will not prevail
at the administrative level; for example, when the agency has routinely
taken a position at odds with that for which the plaintiff would argue. 61
Probable futility from a claimant's standpoint, however, does not imply
that requiring exhaustion would be practically pointless from the
agency's standpoint or would serve only to delay relief. It is often
overlooked that "the purposes underlying the exhaustion doctrine
include the opportunity for the agency to exercise its discretion and
expertise and the opportunity to make a record for the district court
to review. "62
Most courts would look with disfavor upon a claimant's argument
that he should be permitted to bypass the decision stage and move to
an immediate decision by a higher court based on the record, but
absent any judgment, on the grounds that the trial court has consistently
rejected the claimant's crucial legal argument and that waiting for a
trial court judgment and opinion is pointless delay. Administrative
agencies have similar interests. Even if the agency does not choose to
reverse its established legal position in a given case, it may benefit
from an opportunity to rethink or improve the rationale underlying
that position. For the courts to ignore such considerations by waiving
exhaustion based merely on a showing by the plaintiff of probable
futility from the plaintiff's own standpoint is to risk seriously intruding
on proper agency functioning in ways that are ultimately barred by
considerations of the constitutional separation of powers.
The claim that each of the timing doctrines has a constitutional
component, and in particular a separation of powers component, is
perhaps most controversial in the case of the doctrine of ripeness. It
is frequently denied that ripeness has, or should have, any constitutional
component, and those who acknowledge some such constitutional
element of ripeness too often focus excessively on Article III case or
controversy issues, to the neglect of Article II separation of powers
concerns.
The cases and commentary on ripeness tend to veer from the proper
path in drawing too much from the dangerous notion that ripeness is
merely a judicially created limitation on the availability of judicial
61. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, § 8.31, at 505-06 (citing Wolff v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd., 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967)).
62. United States v. Steele (In re Steele), 799 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis in the original).
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review. 63 Even if ripeness is thought of as judicially created, this should
not imply that ripeness is simply a contingent, prudential, and, there-
fore, non-constitutionally required doctrine. Yet some courts have taken
the extra step of finding ripeness to be a matter of prudence and non-
constitutional pragmatism, 64 and supplementing the substantial support
among the commentators for this view. 6 This may also reflect inad-
equate appreciation for the possibility that even a very "pragmatic"66
inquiry into ripeness may result in conclusions that deeply and directly
implicate constitutional values.
Of course, not all courts and commentators have declined to recognize
or approve of the constitutional status of ripeness. The issue is
sometimes simply held open, 67 or ripeness is referred to, with quali-
fication, as "largely" prudential, 68 or as a doctrine that "overlaps at
its borders" with the case or controversy requirements of Article 111.69
Some cases suggest that the relationship between ripeness and Article
63. See R. PIERCE, S. SaHpRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 4, § 57.4, at 196 (citing
the leading case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507,
18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967)).
64. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd per curiam, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) ("[r]ipeness is a prudential question").
Remarkably, Judge Easterbrook relies in part on a Supreme Court case that states
the issue as whether the plaintiffs' claims "demonstrate sufficient ripeness to establish
a concrete case or controversy." Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 579, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3332, 87 L. Ed. 2d 409, 418 (1985). The existence
of a case or controversy is plainly a matter of minimum Article III requirements. It
should be noted that as the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut found the plaintiff's claims
to be prudentially ripe, the court was logically required to consider whether the claims
were unripe in any constitutional sense. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327.
65. See, e.g., Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in
Administrative Law, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1443, 1516 (1971) ("[u]nlike 'finality', ...
the term 'ripeness' does not have statutory status, and the Court is not therefore
constitutionally bound to find work for it to do"). On this Article's analysis, of
course, the document that constitutionally binds the Court to find work for ripeness
is the Constitution itself. For an extended criticism of a perceived judicial tendency
to "constitutionalize" ripeness, see Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Cm.
L. REV. 153 (1987).
66. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965, 970 (D. Alaska 1987) (a
pragmatic ripeness analysis).
67. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,
826 F.2d 101, 104 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("we need not address here whether . . lack
of ripeness here implicates article III"); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. I.C.C.,
747 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (raising the possibility, but not deciding, that
ripeness may to some extent implicate the case or controversy requirement).
68. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. E.P.A., 759 F.2d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 915; Consolidation Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 824 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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III may be fairly characterized as more than a marginal overlap. 70
The logic of the courts that have implicitly, if not explicitly, rec-
ognized an Article III constitutional dimension of ripeness is relatively
straightforward. The doctrine of ripeness operates to prevent the
abstract adjudication of disputes lacking minimal concreteness and
definiteness. 7' Issues that are legally ripe for definitive judicial resolution
have, therefore, been contrasted with the hypothetical and speculative
bases for issuing an advisory opinion.7 2 More broadly, a violation of
the ripeness doctrine tends to turn the function of judicial review into
what might be called "judicial preview, ' 73 and the " '[n]o roving
preview function has been assigned to courts in the federal system.' ,,74
Finally, courts occasionally have explicitly or, more frequently,
implicitly drawn upon Article II constitutional concerns in defining the
scope of the exhaustion doctrine. The Supreme Court's recognition
that the ripeness doctrine serves "to protect the agencies from judicial
interference" '75 qualifies as this sort of implicit recognition. It is
occasionally explicitly inferred from the judicial interference analysis
that ripeness has both an Article II and an Article III constitutional
component. 76 The fact that ripeness has an Article II component is
inescapable, because it is dictated by the logic of the purposes discussed
above as underlying the doctrine of ripeness itself. This is insufficiently
appreciated, even by those commentators who explicitly link ripeness
to the separation of powers. 77
70. See, e.g., South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. I.C.C., 734 F.2d 1541, 1545
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Air New Zealand Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 726 F.2d 832, 835
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (per Scalia, J.) (concluding that "ripeness is an important element
of our judicial tradition, and indeed-in some applications at least-of the 'case or
controversy' requirement of the Constitution itself").
71. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
1986).
72. See Patterson v. County of Tehama, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1298, 235 Cal. Rptr.
867, 874 (1987) (review denied and ordered not to be officially published June 25,
1987).
73. Northern Natural Gas Div. of Internorth v. F.E.R.C., 780 F.2d 59, 63 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (quoting Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. F.E.R.C., 736 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
74. Id.
75. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515,
18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691 (1967); see also Associated Gas Distribs. v. F.E.R.C., 824
F.2d 981, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting the relevant language from Abbott Labo-
ratories).
76. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
77. See Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAmE
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Those commentators who would deny even Article III constitutional
content to ripeness 78 focus on the doctrine's pragmatic, often prudential
character, its flexibility, and its sensitivity to particular case circum-
stances, as well as the availability of justiciability doctrines such as
standing to do the more clearly constitutional work.79 This approach,
however, assumes a greater degree of choice in the matter than the
logic of the concepts will allow. Ripeness simply and unavoidably
implicates constitutional concerns both significantly and directly, as do
each of the other timing-device doctrines discussed in this article. One
leading critic of ripeness as a "constitutionalized" doctrine has rec-
ognized that "[tihe ripeness barrier thus allows federal courts to give
due respect to the scope of responsibilities allocated to other government
decisionmakers. '"80 This function is neither invariably and completely
prudential, nor always satisfactorily fulfilled by doctrines such as
standing. In separation of powers terms, for example, it is plain that
what was unconstitutional about President Truman's seizure of the
steel mills was precisely his failure to give due respect to the scope of
responsibilities allocated to Congress, a co-equal governmental deci-
sionmaker. 81 We can remove the constitutional content from the ripeness
doctrine only at the price of significantly impairing the constitutional
values we seek to preserve. 82
In sum, each of the timing doctrines discussed in this essay una-
voidably retains some constitutional content. Further, the constitutional
L. REv. 862, 931 (1985) (linking ripeness to the separation of powers, but limiting
its attention to the function of ripeness in ensuring that courts do not adjudicate
mere "generalized grievances," as opposed to a concern for unimpaired executive
branch agency functioning).
78. See, e.g., Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 1915, 1915 (1986) ("[T]he Supreme Court has attempted to pour content into
article III by constitutionalizing .. .ripeness."); Vining, supra note 65, at 1509, 1516;
Nichol, supra note 65, at 153.
79. See Nichol, supra note 65, at 155-56.
80. Id. at 178.
81. See generally Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72
S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).
82. Then-Judge Antonin Scalia observed that "[t]he degree to which the courts
become converted into political forums depends not merely upon what issues they are
permitted to address, but also upon when and at whose instance they are permitted
to address them." Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. Rev. 881, 892 (1983) (emphasis in the original).
A fair inference from this observation is that the various timing doctrines, or the"when," is no less a part of the separation of powers than the "who," or the
standing question. What the courts and commentators have failed to supply is "a
rigorous and explicit theory" as to why this should be so. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,
699 F.2d 1166, 1177, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
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content of each of the doctrines partakes at least as much of Article
II and minimally unimpaired executive branch functioning as of the
Article III case or controversy requirement. It is not surprising, in
view of the obvious mutual overlap of the doctrines, that in certain
circumstances each doctrine retains some constitutional element of
roughly equal degree. One explanation for why this overlap has not
been adequately recognized may be the occasional utility to courts and
litigators of concluding or arguing that a given claim does or does
not rise to constitutional dimension. If it becomes plausible to argue
that one or more of the timing doctrines has a lesser constitutional
dimension than the others, perhaps due to its judge-created or allegedly
more prudential character, that argument will be made by the litigant
in whose interest it is to do so, and, in a given instance, may be
adopted and perpetuated by the court. The present state of confusion,
and of widespread belief that some of the timing doctrines have some
minimal constitutional content, is also one of great flexibility.
IV. Ticor and the Fragmentation of the Law
The recent District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals case of
Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. F.T.C.83 deserves some consideration in
its own right as the case that most dramatically illustrates the nearly
complete breakdown of the predictable utility of the various timing
doctrines in the administrative context. The crucial substantive issue
posed in Ticor was the constitutionality, under Article II, of the broad
exercise of executive authority by the so-called independent agencies
not directly subject to presidential control.84 The District of Columbia
Circuit was unanimous in declining to reach the merits. The court's
unanimity dissolved, however, on the question of the most appropriate
general rationale for staying its judicial hand. The panel, consisting
of Circuit Judges Edwards and Williams and District Judge Joyce Hens
Green, sitting by designation, essentially ventured off in three separate
directions, thereby confirming Judge Green's reference to "the confused
and often contradictory nature of the law of this circuit concerning
the related doctrines of finality, exhaustion, and ripeness." 85 Judge
Edwards' line of analysis focused on exhaustion to the exclusion of
ripeness and finality. 86 Judge Williams, in contrast, preferred the use
83. 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. See id. at 732.
85. Id. at 750 (opinion of Green, J.).
86. See id. at 736 (opinion of Edwards, J.).
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of the finality doctrine, as opposed to exhaustion or ripeness. 7 Judge
Green completed the analytical triad by concluding that "the ripeness
doctrine provides the soundest basis for the result we reach today.""8
This Article will not endeavor to chase down the detailed logic of
any of the opinions in Ticor, because some of the arguments focus
principally on the narrow issue of attempting to reconcile prior District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals opinions and because some are
adapted to the particular procedural context of the Ticor case itself.
However, some general observations can be made. First, it seems clear
that the right general result was reached, especially in view of the
assertion by Ticor of certain non-constitutional defenses to the Federal
Trade Commision complaint 9 on which Ticor might prevail, thereby
avoiding the necessity of deciding the monumental constitutional issue
of the legitimacy of independent agencies. 90
Whether this result is constitutionally compelled, however, is open
to serious doubt. Regardless of whether we adopt a rule waiving a
statutory or non-statutory exhaustion requirement for cases involving
a facial constitutional challenge to the agency's underlying authority, 9l
it would be difficult to detect a genuine violation of Article II or
Article III in the court's deciding Ticor on the merits without the
87. See id. at 746, 750 (opinion of Williams, J.).
88. Id. at 750 (opinion of Green, J.).
89. Id. at 732 (opinion of Edwards, J.).
90. Cf. Doe v. Weinberger, 820 F.2d 1275, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to
reach constitutional issue of legitimacy of statutory exclusion of judicial review in
light of possibility that exhaustion of administrative remedies may make such issues
moot); Dhangu v. I.N.S., 812 F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to reach
constitutional issue in view of possibility that administrative exhaustion may make
such issues moot).
91. See Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 824 F.2d 1205, 1210 n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (constitutional nature of claimant's challenge to agency regulation does not"entitle a party to bypass statutory exhaustion requirements"). Compare Andrade v.
Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (agency without power or authority to*
decide the constitutional issue raised and without relevant expertise to assist the court)
and Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 I11. 2d 543, 359 N.E.2d 113 (1976) (distinction
drawn between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes in exhaustion
context) and B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, § 8.37, at 518 (where there is a facial
constitutional challenge, "the administrative process is unlikely to contribute anything
to the resolution of the challenge") with Lively v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 268, 269-70 (8th
Cir. 1987) (constitutional issue raised must not be clearly without merit) and Dawson
v. Cole, 485 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) ("[T]he mere allegation of a
[facial] constitutional issue is not sufficient to make the general rule of exhaustion
inapplicable" in light of considerations of judicial and administrative economy.) and
Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376, 392 (1985) (even some constitutional
challenges may require factual development at the administrative proceeding level).
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benefit of agency insight on the underlying independent agency authority
issue. The monumental underlying constitutional issue with respect to
the broad range of independent agency powers obviously transcends
the purview of the Federal Trade Commision or any other agency. In
addition, it is doubtful that the agency can intelligently contribute
much to the resolution of this broad issue that cannot be conveyed if
the administrative exhaustion requirement is bypassed. Nor are we
comforted if the Federal Trade Commission solemnly announces that,
based on the hearing and briefs, it is satisfied that Ticor's broad
underlying constitutional challenge is unconvincing.
Even if Ticor had not raised non-constitutional defenses, the ad-
ministrative-level success of which might render moot its monumental
constitutional challenge, the case would still be rightly decided, if on
prudential, as opposed to constitutional, grounds. Even if we assume
that the underlying facial constitutional challenge will one day be
resolved by the Supreme Court, and that the agency's detailed factual
development of any particular challenge will not shed much light on
that broad issue, we still have reason to encourage courts to stay their
hand until absolutely necessary. A delay of even a year or two in
resolving a monumentally complex constitutional issue, with all sorts
of dimly foreseeable consequences of varying severity, may well serve
to allow additional informal -analysis, reflection, and debate among
scholars, judges, and agency officials. With the stakes as high as they
are in these matters, an extra year or two of additional evidence or
discussion seems well worth buying at the expense of Ticor having to
route its cause through the administrative process.
In Ticor itself, Judge Edwards opted for an exhaustion, as opposed
to a ripeness, analysis based in part on his explicit contrast between
the two doctrines:
The exhaustion doctrine emphasizes the position of the party seeking
review; in essence, it asks whether he may be attempting to short
circuit the administrative process or whether he has been reasonably
diligent in protecting his own interests. Ripeness, by contrast, is
concerned primarily with the institutional relationships between
courts and agencies, and the competence of the courts to resolve
disputes without further administrative refinement of the issues. In
extreme cases, the ripeness doctrine serves to implement the policy
behind Article III of the Constitution. 92
92. Ticor, 814 F.2d at 735 (opinion of Edwards, J.) (quoting E. GELLHORNI & B.
BOYER, AnMmusrArvE LAW AND PROCESS 316-19 (1981)).
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Of course, to claim that the difference between exhaustion and
ripeness is a matter of emphasis is not to make a dramatic claim, but
even this claim is perhaps doubtful. One might as well say that
exhaustion, as much as ripeness, concerns itself with the relations
between courts and agencies as institutions. The quoted distinction
recognizes a limited Article III component of ripeness, but, at least
by implication, fails to recognize an Article II component of ripeness,
or a constitutional element, even in extreme cases, for the doctrine of
exhaustion.
Judge Williams' opinion adopted finality as the appropriate rubric
to decide the case on the grounds that finality was a statutory
jurisdictional prerequisite to review, 9 whereas "exhaustion and ripeness
are judge-made prudential doctrines. . . ."9 This view is, at best,
controversial and dubious on the merits. 95 Judge Williams' own opinion
recognizes that exhaustion and ripeness, as well as finality, "serve the
interests in agency autonomy." Beyond some point, judicial intrusion
on or impairment of executive branch "autonomy" involves a violation
of Article II.
To complete the contrast, Judge Green's opinion urged that "the
ripeness doctrine presents the only bar to immediate judicial consid-
eration of appellants' claims, as the policies and purposes underlying
the finality and exhaustion requirements do not dictate further post-
ponement of judicial review." ' The judge's conclusion that the ex-
haustion doctrine could not be utilized to bar immediate judicial
entertainment of the Ticor challenge was flawed on two grounds. First,
while it was true that exhaustion was futile in the sense that the Federal
Trade Commission was unlikely to disavow its prosecutorial authority
on constitutional grounds," exhaustion was not necessarily futile in
the crucial sense that Ticor might well prevail at the agency level on
one or more of the non-constitutional grounds raised, 99 thus making
moot the broad constitutional issue. Second, Judge Green's opinion
emphasized the public interest in resolving the broad constitutional
claims of ongoing unconstitutional activities of the independent agen-
93. Id. at 745 (opinion of Williams, J.).
94. Id. at 746 (opinion of Williams, J.) (emphasis in the original).
95. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (exhaustion), notes 64-92 and
accompanying text (ripeness).
96. Ticor, 814 F.2d at 745 (opinion of Williams, J.).
97. Id. at 751 (opinion of Green, J.).
98. Id. at 752 (opinion of Green, J.).
99. See id. at 732 (opinion of Edwards, J.).
19871
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
cies. 10 The opinion, however, gave apparently no weight to the public
interest in having those monumental constitutional issues resolved only
after opportunity for the fullest reasonable examination, inquiry, dis-
cussion and debate among all interested persons is made available.
This interest is hardly served by bypassing the agency process.
According to Judge Green, ripeness was the appropriate doctrine to
avoid immediate judicial intervention on the ground that avoiding a
finding of unripeness, in contrast to the failure to exhaust, "always
requires some showing of hardship."'' This analysis is, itself, contro-
versial, particularly in the District of Columbia Circuit. While some
support for the view that ripeness requires a showing of hardship
beyond proving that the issues presented are minimally crystallized,
developed, and suitable for judicial resolution exists, 10 2 there is also
support for the view that if a claimant can show that the issues are
fit for judicial resolution, no extraordinary or special showing of
hardship to the claimant, if judicial resolution is delayed, is required. 103
Judge Green's rationale for requiring an independent hardship analysis
focused on the concern that a contrary rule "would make agencies
but a poor relation of the courts, reducing their function in many
instances to the mere collection of data and refinement of issues for
judicial resolution." 0 4 This observation, of course, reinforces the Article
II component of ripeness which this Article has found to be shared
with the other timing doctrines. 05
100. Id. at 754 (opinion of Green, J.).
101. Id. at 755 (opinion of Green, J.).
102. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
824 F.2d 1071, 1094-96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681,
691 (1967)).
103. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 826 F.2d
101, 110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (citing Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.
v. E.P.A., 759 F.2d 905, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Federal
Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 824 F.2d 1071, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring); cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ,
826 F.2d at 108 n.6 (per Bork, J.) ("We express no opinion on the extent to which
ripeness analysis requires the court to balance the fitness of the issues against the
hardship to the parties.").
104. Ticor, 814 F.2d at 756 (opinion of Green, J.).
105. Id. Judge Green rejected Judge Williams' finality analysis on the grounds that
"finality is a flexible and pragmatic concept." Id. (opinion of Green, J.) (emphasis
in original). One of the lessons of this Article, of course, has been that ripeness and
exhaustion, certainly no less than a statutory and apparently jurisdictional finality
requirement, may be thought of as flexible and pragmatic concepts, a fact that does
not bear conclusively on the nature or degree of any constitptional component of the
doctrines.
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